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ON THE LEGALITY OF GENE PATENTS 
DIANNE NICOL∗ 
[This article considers the legal and policy deliberations on gene patenting that have occurred since 
the issue came to the fore in the early 1990s. The analysis is contextualised with brief overviews of 
the science of genetics and genomics and the law of patents. Legislation, administrative guidelines 
and case law are analysed, focusing on the jurisdictions of Australia, the US and the UK. This article 
concludes that, despite ongoing legal and policy developments, clear guidance as to the legality of 
gene patents remains elusive. It is obviously desirable to have proper and certain gene patenting 
laws. In time, this is likely to happen. In the interim, it is argued that other mechanisms are also 
available for dealing with gene patents, negating the desirability of a radical overhaul of gene 
patenting laws.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
All member states of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) are obliged to 
make patents available for all inventions in all fields of technology, provided that 
they fulfil the patent validity requirements of novelty, inventive step (or non-ob-
viousness) and industrial applicability (or utility), as provided by art 27 of the 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.1 Article 29 
of TRIPS identifies the disclosure requirements: member states must require that 
the invention be fully described, including the best method of performance. 
These patentability and disclosure requirements encapsulate the core features 
of the patent bargain. The 20-year monopoly afforded to standard patents2 
around the world is only granted by states for inventions that are patentable and 
fully disclosed. The public is said to benefit from this bargain in two ways. First, 
the 20-year monopoly rewards innovation on the part of the patent holder. 
Second, full disclosure encourages others to innovate by inventing around live 
patents and by making use of the disclosed invention once the patent has 
expired.3 However, the public benefit can easily be distorted if patent holders are 
overly rewarded with too great a monopoly for their innovation, or if there is 
insufficient disclosure of the invention leading to uncertainty as to its true nature 
and its best method of performance. Both could discourage or restrict innovation 
by others. 
Problems may also arise if patent holders are inadequately rewarded for their 
innovation. This can happen if the patent monopoly is unduly restrictive, or if the 
validity of the patent is uncertain. In such situations, patent holders might be 
discouraged from making optimal use of a patent monopoly, and both patent 
holders and others may be discouraged from further innovation. Hence, it is 
essential that patent law set proper and certain boundaries on what is and is not 
patentable and that patents are only granted for inventions that meet the pat-
entability and disclosure requirements. 
Nowhere are the boundaries of patent law less certain than for genetic inven-
tions. Over the last 14 or so years, these gene patents4 have attracted more 
academic debate, policy discussion and calls for law reform than any other type 
of patent. From the Australian perspective, these policy and law reform issues 
were most recently canvassed by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(‘ALRC’) in its inquiry into gene patenting and human health.5 There is a 
growing body of jurisprudence considering the legality of gene patents in some 
 
 1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3, annex 1C (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘TRIPS’). 
 2 Some countries also have a lesser form of patent grant. In Australia, for example, innovation 
patents are granted for up to eight years: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 62, 68. A lower level of 
inventiveness is required for innovation patents than for standard patents: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 
ss 7(2)–(3) (inventive step requirements), 7(4)–(5) (innovative step requirements). 
 3 Various theories have been postulated to justify patents, primarily focusing on economic 
rationales rather than the natural or moral rights of the inventor. Currently, the dominant para-
digm is the incentive to innovate. For a full discussion, see Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard R 
Nelson, ‘Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents’ (1998) 32 Journal of 
Economic Issues 1031. See also Lee Bendekgey and Diana Hamlet-Cox, ‘Gene Patents and 
Innovation’ (2002) 77 Academic Medicine 1373. 
 4 The precise boundaries of the term ‘gene patent’ are also uncertain. In this article, the term is 
intended to encompass any patent that includes a claim to a deoxyribonucleic acid (‘DNA’) 
sequence.  
 5 ALRC, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, Report No 99 (2004). The 
final report of the inquiry was tabled in federal Parliament in August 2004. The only other areas 
that have attracted similar levels of debate are software patents and business method patents. 
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jurisdictions, particularly in the US.6 Alongside these developments, genetic 
technology continues to advance and gene patent applications continue to be 
filed in ever-increasing numbers.7 A recent study by Kyle Jensen and Fiona 
Murray concluded that nearly 20 per cent of all human genes have been claimed 
in patents granted in the US, with some genes featuring in up to 20 separate 
patents.8 
So many years into the gene patent debate, it is timely to reflect on how far we 
have come, to assess whether the legality of gene patenting is any clearer now 
than it was 14 years ago, to determine whether the lack of clarity in this area has 
produced any undesirable outcomes, and to consider whether anything needs to 
be done to better protect the public benefit. This article seeks to canvass these 
and related issues. In doing so, some of the key judicial decisions, legislation and 
policy statements will be analysed. 
I I   THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A  Primer on Genetics and Genomics 
Any discussion regarding gene patenting must necessarily being with the 
science of genetics and genomics. Although the modern science is staggeringly 
complex and rapidly evolving, the core concepts are relatively simple. It is not 
necessary to go too far beyond these concepts to understand the legal issues that 
are being raised in the courts and in policy debates.  
We should start with a mention of the unique structure of the DNA molecule. 
DNA is a complex chemical that is made up of a sequence of nucleotides, each 
of which contains one of the four bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine. 
In humans there are around three billion of these nucleotides arranged in precise 
order along our chromosomes. 
One of the primary functions of DNA is as a source of the information neces-
sary to produce all of the proteins required by a living organism.9 The site on the 
DNA molecule that carries the information to produce a particular protein is the 
gene.10 Each protein is produced by the same two-step process. In the first step, 
 
 6 It is interesting to note, however, that there has been hardly any discussion of such matters in the 
Australian courts.  
 7 The World Health Organization provides some useful data on the general rise in patents in 
biotechnology in World Health Organization, Genetics, Genomics and the Patenting of DNA: 
Review of Potential Implications for Health in Developing Countries (2005) 20. 
 8 Kyle Jensen and Fiona Murray, ‘Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome’ (2005) 
310 Science 239, 239. Over 75 per cent of these gene patents have only one patent owner, but 
the remainder have fragmented ownership. The authors report that the two genes with the most 
fragmented ownership have eight assignees for nine patents, and 12 assignees for 14 patents: at 
240. Such fragmented ownership is likely to increase significantly the cost of access for down-
stream innovators. See also Birgit Verbeure, Gert Matthijs and Geertrui Van Overwalle, ‘Analys-
ing DNA Patents in relation with Diagnostic Genetic Testing’ (12 October 2005) European 
Journal of Human Genetics 1 <http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/5201503a 
.pdf>.  
 9 This is also our hereditary information, and another function of DNA is to pass on this 
information to our descendants.  
 10 There is not a direct one-to-one correspondence of genes to proteins. In humans, for example, 
the latest estimates of the number of genes are as low as 20 000, yet there are far more proteins. 
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known as transcription, a precise copy of the information encoded in the gene is 
made within another complex molecule, messenger ribonucleic acid (‘mRNA’). 
In the second step, called translation, groups of three nucleotides on the mRNA 
(known as codons) pair with a particular amino acid, and the amino acids are 
joined together to form strands known as polypeptides. The proteins formed by 
these polypeptides have to go through various conformational changes before 
they can perform their function. 
It is generally the case that only a small portion of the protein is functional. As 
a result, it is possible to alter some of the amino acids without affecting their 
function. The group of related amino acid sequences that all perform the same 
function is sometimes referred to as a genus. This feature creates a dilemma for 
holders of patents claiming rights over such proteins. Unless the entire genus is 
claimed, small changes to non-functional parts can be made without infringing 
the patent. Hence, the goal of the patent holder is to obtain broad enough patents 
to cover the entire genus of functionally-equivalent proteins.11 
There is some redundancy in the translation code, because there are 64 codons 
yet only 20 amino acids. Most amino acids are, therefore, complementary to 
more than one mRNA codon. This is known as degeneracy of the code. Hence, 
the same sequence of amino acids can be created from a number of different 
DNA sequences, also often referred to as a genus. The story is further compli-
cated by the fact that there is not a straight transition from DNA to mRNA to 
protein, because not all of the DNA in the region of the gene codes for amino 
acids. The non-coding regions are removed following the transcription process. 
There are various incentives for research aimed at understanding how these 
processes work. In humans, the primary focus is health care, which includes: 
• identifying and testing for genetic diseases; 
• producing synthetic therapeutic proteins to replace defective natural proteins;  
• producing other small molecule drugs that interact with particular proteins; 
and  
• developing therapies to rectify or replace defective genes.  
In other species, the research effort is directed towards developing improvements 
to the food supply as well as therapeutics, and focuses on manipulating the 
genome by inserting foreign genes, activating and deactivating host genes and so 
on. 
One of the greatest landmarks in this research effort was the discovery of how 
to splice and clone genes. The first gene splices were performed by Herbert 
Boyer and Stanley Cohen in 1973.12 Gene splicing led to the development of 
recombinant DNA technology. By splicing short strands of DNA from one 
 
Hence, a particular gene might carry the information to make several proteins. See International 
Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, ‘Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the Human 
Genome’ (2004) 431 Nature 931. 
 11 John Barton provides some useful scenarios which assist in further clarifying this issue: John H 
Barton, ‘Changing Intellectual Property Issues in the Biotechnology Industry’ (1999) 18 Bio-
technology Law Report 3, 4.  
 12 See National Research Council, Intellectual Property Rights and the Dissemination of Research 
Tools in Molecular Biology (1997) 40–2. 
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species into the DNA from other more rapidly reproducing species, further 
research and the production of usable quantities of proteins coded for by those 
strands were both facilitated. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, a plan was formulated to map and sequence the 
entire human genome. In 1990, the Human Genome Project was established for 
this purpose.13 In part, the Project was facilitated by the development of a new 
technique, reverse transcription, whereby complementary DNA (‘cDNA’) copies 
of mRNA could be made.14 Since mRNA is only transcribed from active genes 
within the DNA sequence, the cDNA produced by reverse transcription will also 
be a copy of those active genes. In general, however, the cDNA copy will not 
have precisely the same gene sequence as the original DNA that was used to 
transcribe the mRNA, known as genomic DNA (‘gDNA’), because it contains 
only the coding components of the gDNA. 
Short fragments of cDNA are known as expressed sequence tags (‘ESTs’). 
These ESTs are derived from genes, as they are copied from mRNA. However, 
the identity of the genes, their location and their function are not known. ESTs 
can be powerful research tools, particularly as probes for the genes from which 
they are derived. The development of EST technology was therefore an impor-
tant step in the progress of the research effort. It also signalled the start of the 
debate about gene patents. In 1992, the Human Genome Project was described as 
the biggest patenting issue in the US,15 due to the large number of patents for 
ESTs in 1991 that were applied for by the National Institutes of Health (‘NIH’), 
the biggest public sector research organisation in the US.16 
In the new millennium, research into identifying, isolating and manipulating 
individual genes and understanding the basis of genetic disease continues. Vast 
monetary commitments have been made to international collaborative ventures 
focusing on whole genome research, such as the HapMap Project and the SNP 
Consortium,17 and a host of other projects.  
Following the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003, research in 
the so-called post-genomic era focuses on matters such as: 
• understanding the structure and function of the genome as a whole, and how 
gene coding and non-coding regions interact; 
• understanding how mRNA works, and how exons and introns interact; and 
• understanding how proteins acquire their structure and function. 
 
 13 For a history of the Human Genome Project, see the National Human Genome Research 
Institute, All about the Human Genome Project (HGP) (2005) <http://www.genome.gov/1000 
1772>. 
 14 For a useful discussion of this technology, see Bendekgey and Hamlet-Cox, above n 3, 1373–5. 
 15 Linda Maher, ‘The Patent Environment: Domestic and European Community Frameworks for 
Biotechnology’ (1992) 33 Jurimetrics Journal 67, 128. 
 16 See, eg, Rebecca Eisenberg, ‘Genes, Patents and Product Development’ (1992) 257 Science 903.  
 17 One of the lead funding agencies of both projects, the Wellcome Trust, describes these ventures 
as two global partnerships that are characterising variations in the human genome. It states that 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (‘SNPs’) are changes to single letters of the DNA code, which 
occur in about one in every 1000 nucleotides. The SNP Consortium is mapping these SNPs, 
whereas the HapMap Project is investigating the combinations of SNPs that are inherited to-
gether: Wellcome Trust, The SNP Consortium and the International HapMap Project (2005) 
<http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD003500.html>. 
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B  The Rise of the Biotechnology Industry 
A thriving biotechnology industry has emerged in parallel with these research 
developments, focusing on the advancement of new medicines, genetic tests and 
therapies in the medical sector and genetically-modified organisms in the 
agricultural sector. While each of these developments has attracted some 
controversy,18 the public benefit from biotechnology has prevailed, with many 
governments looking to the industry for future economic growth.19 However, 
much like the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology is research intensive, 
failure rates are high and there is a long road from research to product develop-
ment. Further, as with pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology firms place 
great reliance on their patent portfolios. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the early leaders in the medical biotechnology indus-
try followed three main lines of research and development.20 First, a number of 
companies were set up to produce therapeutic proteins by means of recombinant 
DNA technology. John Barton refers to this phase of the development of the 
industry as ‘old’, ‘traditional’ and ‘first generation’.21 Examples of old biotech-
nology companies include Genentech and Kirin-Amgen. Their products included 
recombinant insulin, erythropoietin (‘EPO’), human growth factor, tissue 
plasminogen activator, tumour necrosis factor and various other proteins. As we 
shall see, the patents covering many of these products have been heavily 
litigated. Rebecca Eisenberg refers to this phase of gene patenting as ‘patenting 
genes as drugs’.22 
The second and third lines of research and development are what Barton 
referred to in 1999 as the ‘new generation’ of biotechnology.23 During the 1990s, 
a number of companies had become specialised in hunting for specific dis-
ease-related genes, locating them within the human genome, isolating them, 
sequencing their codes and developing diagnostic tests. Perhaps the best example 




 18 In the medical sector, many of the complex ethical, legal and social issues arising from these 
developments were canvassed by the ALRC and the Australian Health Ethics Committee in their 
joint report entitled Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Information in Austra-
lia, Report No 96 (2003). In the agricultural sector, see, eg, the recent US report of the Commit-
tee on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, 
National Research Council, Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation 
(2000), and the earlier Australian report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Industry, Science and Technology, Parliament of Australia, Genetic Manipulation: The Threat or 
the Glory (1992). 
 19 For example, in Australia, the federal government has expressed strong support for the 
development of an Australian biotechnology industry: see Biotechnology Australia, Australian 
Biotechnology: A National Strategy (2000). See also Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, ‘The Aus-
tralian Medical Biotechnology Industry and Access to Intellectual Property: Issues for Patent 
Law Development’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 347. 
 20 At around the same time, Monsanto and other agricultural companies were developing 
techniques for genetically modifying crop species. 
 21 Barton, ‘Changing Intellectual Property Issues in the Biotechnology Industry’, above n 11, 3. 
 22 Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘Why the Gene Patenting Controversy Persists’ (2002) 77 Academic 
Medicine 1381, 1381.  
 23 Barton, ‘Changing Intellectual Property Issues in the Biotechnology Industry’, above n 11, 5–9. 
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patents relating to two genes linked to increased susceptibility to breast cancer 
(BRCA 1 and 2).24 For Eisenberg, this phase is ‘patenting genes as diagnostic 
products’.25 
At around the same time, other companies including Celera Genomics, Incyte 
Genomics and Human Genome Sciences focused their research efforts on 
automated sequencing of large numbers of DNA fragments. Once again, the 
patent claims made by these companies have been highly controversial. For 
Eisenberg, these types of claims amount to ‘patenting genes as research tools’ 
and ‘patenting genes as trivial advances’, moving away from patenting end 
products towards patenting scientific information.26 
The biotechnology industry is even more complex now than it was in the late 
1990s. The industry has undergone massive expansion. Some companies, 
especially those in sequencing, have diversified while others have specialised. 
New industry sectors have developed, including genomics, bioinformatics, and 
gene chip technology, to name a few. Barton argues that patents owned by these 
companies, covering such subject matter as computer-based genomic informa-
tion, databases and manipulating procedures, could create more serious encum-
brances for medical research than patents on ESTs.27 One of the dominant 
features of the industry is that innovation is cumulative: many small steps must 
be taken on the road to product development and many pathways intersect and 
overlap. Where each step or pathway is protected by a patent, the pace of 
innovation could be slowed, particularly when broad patent rights are granted to 
early innovators.28 
The public sector has been heavily involved in the expansion of the biotech-
nology industry. This has occurred both indirectly through input of findings from 
the Human Genome Project, and directly through applied research, often in 
collaboration with industry partners. The result is the formation of a significant 
private industry around pre-product development research.29 This is part of a  
 
 
 24 In November 2004, Myriad Diagnostics sold its BRCA patents to the University of Utah 
Research Foundation, but it continues to hold exclusive licences to the patents: see Institut 
Curie, ‘Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene BRCA1: Another Victory for Opponents 
of Patents Held by Myriad Genetics: European Patent Office Rejects the Essential Points of 
BRCA1 Gene Patents’ (Press Release, 31 January 2005) <http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/ 
myriadpatents310105.pdf>. 
 25 Eisenberg, ‘Why the Gene Patenting Controversy Persists’, above n 22, 1382. 
 26 Ibid 1383–5. See also Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘How Can You Patent Genes?’ (2002) 2(3) 
American Journal of Bioethics 3. 
 27 John H Barton, ‘Patents, Genomics, Research and Diagnostics’ (2002) 77 Academic Medicine 
1339, 1339–40. He also adds SNPs to his list: at 1339. 
 28 See especially Suzanne Scotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research 
and the Patent Law’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 32–3. See also Michael A 
Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedi-
cal Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698; Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘Bargaining over the Transfer of 
Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?’ in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (2001). 
 29 Rebecca S Eisenberg and Richard Nelson, ‘Public vs Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?’ 
(2002) 77 Academic Medicine 1392. See also Don Chalmers and Dianne Nicol, ‘Commercialisa-
tion of Biotechnology: Public Trust and Research’ (2004) 6 International Journal of Biotechnol-
ogy 116. 
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wider trend favouring science that has commercial applicability. One outcome is 
that the patent pathway has been pushed back further, right to the point of 
scientific discovery. 
The success of this commercialisation drive is evinced by the fact that public 
sector organisations currently own a significant share of granted gene patents, at 
least in the US.30 As noted above, debates about gene patenting began in earnest 
with the filing of EST patent applications by the NIH. The EST claims were 
ultimately rejected as they failed to satisfy the patentability requirements,31 and 
were subsequently withdrawn. A change in policy meant that the NIH did not 
pursue the EST patent claims further, but this did not stop a number of compa-
nies from lodging large numbers of similar patent applications. The stated aim of 
the NIH in applying for the EST patents was to encourage product develop-
ment.32 However, they could just as easily have had the opposite effect by 
blocking later downstream research on genes and proteins and development of 
diagnostic tests, therapies and drugs. If nothing else, the NIH’s actions demon-
strated the need for detailed public discussion and clear official guidelines on 
gene patenting.33 
I I I   CHARACTERISING GENE PATENTS 
A DNA sequence claimed in a patent may cover an entire gene or a shorter 
fragment of a gene, for example an EST, or even a sequence from a non-coding 
region of the genome. However, gene patents do not simply claim rights over the 
sequence information; they claim much more than this. Broadly speaking, there 
are four different types of patent claims: 
• product claims, which give the patent holder rights to all uses of the patented 
product, whether they are known at the time of patenting or not, and whether 
they are claimed or not. These are the broadest types of patent claims. They 
are frequently used to protect chemical compounds. One of the crucial issues 
here is the legitimate extent of these claims: that is, whether or not it is per-
missible to claim the entire genus of products that function in the same way 
as the isolated product; 
• process or method claims, which claim broad rights to all uses of a particular 
technology (recombinant DNA technology was protected in this way);  
 
 30 Jensen and Murray, above n 8, 240. The authors estimate that 28 per cent of patents that include 
claims to human genes are owned by public sector organisations, including governments, 
schools, universities, research institutions and hospitals. See also Frederick M Scherer, ‘The 
Economics of Human Gene Patents’ (2002) 77 Academic Medicine 1348, 1357–8. 
 31 See, eg, Eliot Marshall, ‘Intellectual Property: Companies Rush to Patent DNA’ (1997) 275 
Science 780. 
 32 Bernadine Healy, ‘Special Report on Gene Patenting’ (1992) 327 New England Journal of 
Medicine 664, 665. 
 33 By 1992, such public discussions were already underway: a public meeting had been called by 
the Genome Patenting Working Group in the US, and the Patent and Trademark Office had given 
notice of public hearings and requested comments on patent protection for biotechnological 
inventions. See Genome Patenting Working Group, Committee on Life Sciences and Health, 
Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, Federally Funded Genome Research: Science and Technology Transfer 
Issues: Proceedings of a Public Meeting, May 21, 1992 (1992). 
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• product-by-process claims, which cover products made by one specific 
process. Such claims would still cover all uses of those products, but only 
where the product is made using that process. These claims become impor-
tant where the product is already known or where it would otherwise be ex-
cluded from patenting;34 and 
• use or purpose-bound claims, which cover specific disclosed uses of a 
product. Many have argued that gene patents should be restricted to use 
claims.35 
In the 1980s, companies in the therapeutic protein area commonly made prod-
uct-by-process claims to the protein made by means of recombinant DNA 
technology. Kirin-Amgen’s EPO patent provides a good example of these types 
of claims. Kirin-Amgen’s scientists discovered a way of using recombinant DNA 
technology to produce commercial quantities of EPO, an important and rare 
protein that plays a major role in regulating the rate of red blood cell formation. 
Kirin-Amgen successfully obtained patents that included product-by-process 
claims for EPO in a number of countries. The main claim in the Australian patent 
was for:  
A purified and isolated polypeptide having the primary structural conformation 
and one or more of the biological properties of naturally-occurring erythropoi-
etin and characterised by being the product of procaryotic or eucaryotic expres-
sion of an exogenous DNA sequence.36  
Interestingly, the wording of this claim is slightly different in other jurisdictions. 
In Kirin-Amgen’s European patent, for example, the primary claim refers to 
expression in a ‘host cell’ rather than expression of an exogenous DNA se-
quence.37 The importance of this distinction will become apparent later.38 For 
now, it is sufficient to note that the key feature of this claim is that it is not 
restricted to a particular animal species or to a particular amino acid sequence. It 
is a classic genus claim, including all forms of EPO-type polypeptides produced 
by recombinant DNA technology, whatever their source. These claims are  
 
 
 34 It should be noted that despite a tradition of allowing such claims in some jurisdictions, their 
legality is now questionable. See Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] 1 All 
ER 667 (‘Kirin-Amgen’). See below Part IV(D)(1). 
 35 See, eg, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper 
(2002) 71 <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf>; 
Danish Council of Ethics, Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells (2004) 101–2 
<http://www.etiskraad.dk/graphics/03_udgivelser/engelske_publikationer/patenting_human_gen
es/patents04/patenting_human_genes.pdf>. For a detailed evaluation of the pros and cons of 
restricting gene patents to purpose-bound claims, see Sven J R Bostyn, Patenting DNA Se-
quences (Polynucleotides) and Scope of Protection in the European Union: An Evaluation 
(2004) 56–67 <http://www.ivir.nl/publications/bostyn/patentingdna.pdf>. On 26 October 2005, 
the European Parliament passed a resolution entitled Patents for Biotechnology Inventions, cl 5 
of which calls on the European Patent Office to only grant patents in connection with concrete 
applications and to only allow purpose bound protection: <http://www.europarl.eu.int/omk/ 
sipade3?TYPE-DOC=TA&REF=P6-TA-2005-0407&MODE=SIP&L=ENLSTDOC=N>. 
 36 Genetics Institute Inc v Kirin-Amgen Inc [No 3] (1998) 156 ALR 30, 38 (Heerey J) (‘Genetics 
Institute’).  
 37 Kirin-Amgen [2005] 1 All ER 667, 676 (Lord Hoffmann).  
 38 See below Part IV(B). 
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obviously wider than the invention, and they have provided Kirin-Amgen with 
an extremely broad monopoly over the production of this important therapeutic 
protein. 
In the 1990s, sequencing and diagnostics companies started to seek even 
broader product patents, extending beyond known therapeutic proteins to all uses 
of the disclosed sequence information. In effect, patents cast in these terms give 
the patent holder the exclusive right to control all uses of the gene sequence, 
including both its use as a tool for further upstream research and its use in 
commercial research and development of tests, therapies and drugs.39 
A distinction has been drawn in the literature between the use of gene se-
quences as broadly-applicable research platforms that open up unchartered areas 
of investigation, much like recombinant DNA technology did, and their use as 
tools for more downstream research (for example, the use of a gene sequence for 
diagnostic testing for a particular disease).40 Innovation is most likely to be 
inhibited if broad research platforms are not made widely available to follow-on 
researchers.41 However, downstream tools could also have an inhibitory effect on 
innovation if access is denied or made difficult,42 and they could have a pro-
found effect on consumer access to health care.43 For example, Myriad’s suite of 
patents has effectively given it the exclusive right to conduct diagnostic testing 
relating to breast and ovarian cancers, and it has been actively enforcing its 
rights against public and private sector researchers using the BRCA genes as 
well as against laboratories offering BRCA tests in a number of countries.44 
It should be noted that in Europe, the claims in some of Myriad’s patents were 
declared invalid in a series of opposition proceedings in 2004 and 2005.45 These 
 
 39 The Nuffield Council identifies four distinct applications of DNA sequence claims: diagnostic 
testing, research tools or methods, gene therapy or methods, or the production of therapeutic 
proteins to be used as medicines: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 35, 47–8. 
 40 See especially Jorge A Goldstein and Elina Golod, ‘Human Gene Patents’ (2002) 77 Academic 
Medicine 1315, 1326–7; Arti K Rai, ‘Genome Patents: A Case Study in Patenting Research 
Tools’ (2002) 77 Academic Medicine 1368, 1369–70. 
 41 Heller and Eisenberg, above n 28. 
 42 See Rai, ‘Genome Patents’, above n 40, 1369–70, where she argues that there is, in fact, no 
bright line between broad research platforms and more downstream research tools.  
 43 This is illustrated by empirical studies on the impact of gene patent enforcement on the 
provision of diagnostic services and diagnostic research in the US: see especially Mildred K Cho 
et al, ‘Effect of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services’ 
(2003) 5 Journal of Molecular Diagnostics 3; Jon F Merz et al, ‘Diagnostic Testing Fails the 
Test’ (2002) 415 Nature 577. 
 44 See Jordan Paradise, ‘European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast Cancer 
Testing and the Inherent Implications for US Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the 
Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy’ (2004) 59 Food and Drug Law Journal 133. 
 45 Patent EP0699754 relating to BRCA1 was successfully opposed and was revoked on 11 
November 2004, but is the subject of an appeal: European Patent Office, ‘Public Opposition 
Hearing on “Myriad/Breast Cancer” Patent at the European Patent Office (17–19 May)’ (Press 
Release, 13 May 2004) <http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2004_05_13_e. 
htm>. The main claims in Patent EP0705902, also relating to BRCA1, were revoked on 12 
September 2005, but this decision is also the subject of an appeal. The patent had originally 
claimed a number of mutations in the BRCA1 gene and diagnostic methods for determining a 
predisposition to breast cancer. The patent is now limited to a gene probe for detecting a specific 
mutation: European Patent Office, ‘European Patent on Mutations in Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
Susceptibility Gene Amended after Public Hearing’ (Press Release, 25 January 2005) 
<http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2005_01_25_e.htm>. However, opposi-
tion to patent EP0785216 relating to BRCA2 was unsuccessful and the patent was allowed to be 
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decisions have important consequences for diagnostic service providers in 
Europe. However, the extent to which they actually clarify the law relating to 
gene patenting is less clear. The first decision in 2004 primarily rests on techni-
cal issues associated with Myriad’s attempts to amend the claims made in the 
patent to extend their scope. Detailed reasons for the other decisions were not 
available at the time of writing. Consequently, they are not considered further in 
the analysis that follows. 
Despite the highly controversial nature of Myriad’s actions, it had at least 
disclosed mutant sequences and their function. Claims of such breadth become 
even more contentious when they are based solely on EST sequence information, 
without disclosure of the full gene sequence or its function. Two variants of EST 
claims are frequently referred to in the literature: ‘comprising’ claims and 
‘consisting of’ claims. The word ‘comprising’ is recognised in patent law to 
mean ‘including’ or being ‘open-ended’.46 Hence, ‘comprising’ sequence claims 
are generally interpreted to include any subject matter that uses the disclosed 
sequence, even where those uses have not been disclosed.47 On the other hand, 
claims using the words ‘consisting of’ are restricted to the sequence as 
claimed — they are ‘closed’.48 
The attraction for patent holders in making ‘comprising’ EST claims is that it 
means they have rights not only over the EST itself and its use as a research tool, 
but also the full gene sequence, the proteins for which it codes, diagnostic tests, 
and even gene therapies that may subsequently be developed — despite the fact 
that neither the full gene sequence nor its function is disclosed. Thus, these 
patent holders could demand licence fees from any downstream user of the EST 
sequence, even if the user never actually referred to the sequence information 
provided by the patent holder. This seems to be quite a windfall for someone 
who has acquired the EST sequence information entirely through automated 
processes. A ‘consisting of’ claim, on the other hand, would be restricted to the 
EST sequence itself and its use as a research tool. However, it is questionable 
whether a claim of this nature has sufficient usefulness to be patentable. 
Even where a full gene sequence is disclosed and a function has been ascribed 
to the gene, it still may be too great a reward for the patent holder to claim rights 
to all uses of the sequence information. This is particularly the case when the 
sequence information is obtained by computerised sequencing technology and 
function is ascribed solely based on computerised screening for homology with 
other sequences. It is difficult to see how the analogy between DNA and other 
chemical substances can be sustained in such an environment.49 
 
maintained in its amended form. The patent now relates to use of a particular mutation in 
BRCA2 for diagnosing predisposition to breast cancer in Ashkenazi-Jewish women: European 
Patent Office, ‘Patent on “Breast Cancer Gene 2” Patent Maintained in Amended Form after 
Public Hearing’ (Press Release, 29 June 2005) <http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/ 
pressrel/2005_06_29_e.htm>.  
 46 See Goldstein and Golod, above n 40, 1319. 
 47 Genentech Inc v Chiron Corp, 112 F 3d 495, 501 (Rich J) (Fed Cir, 1997). 
 48 Goldstein and Golod, above n 40, 1319. 
 49 The distinction between the ‘bricks and mortar’ world of traditional patent law and the intangible 
world of the information economy is extensively discussed in Eisenberg, ‘How Can You Patent 
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IV  THE LAW:  WHAT EXACTLY CAN BE PATENTED? 
A  Patent Law Primer 
Although TRIPS prescribes the patentability and disclosure requirements that 
must be included in the patent laws of all WTO member states, there is consider-
able variability between countries — both in the substantive law relating to 
patentability and disclosure of gene-related inventions, and in the procedural law 
prescribing the mechanisms for obtaining and maintaining patents. Some of the 
key aspects of obtaining a valid patent are described below, and the main points 
of difference between the three key jurisdictions of Australia, the US and the UK 
are highlighted.50 
1 The Invention Requirement  
Patents can only be claimed for inventions: there must be appropriate subject 
matter. Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, 23 Jac 1, c 3 provided the 
first elucidation of the requirements for a valid patent, specifying that there 
should be a ‘manner of new manufacture’. Some jurisdictions, including Austra-
lia, still retain this terminology.51 
Despite the antiquity of the ‘manner of manufacture’ test, recent reports con-
sidering reform of Australian patent law recognise that this requirement has 
served its purpose well and should remain as the touchstone of patentability.52 In 
the leading Australian case interpreting s 6, National Research Development 
Corp v Commissioner of Patents,53 the High Court set out the key requirements 
that were to be satisfied:  
For a process to fall within the limits of patentability which the context of the 
Statute of Monopolies has supplied, it must be one that offers some advantage 
which is material in the sense that the process belongs to a useful art as distinct 
from a fine art, that its value to the country is in the field of economic endeav-
our.54 
US patent law uses similar but not identical language, providing that: ‘Whoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor …’55 
The case law interpreting the ‘manner of manufacture’ test in Australia and the 
equivalent ‘composition of matter’ test in the US recognises a range of excep-
tions for material that is considered to be unpatentable because it fails to satisfy 
 
Genes?’, above n 26. See also Mark Sagoff et al, ‘Open Peer Commentary’ (2002) 2(3) Ameri-
can Journal of Bioethics 12. 
 50 While other jurisdictions could have been considered, it was never intended that this article 
should be a comprehensive treatise on comparative patent law. Further, Australia, the US and the 
UK were chosen as these are the major marketplaces for the Australian biotechnology industry 
and are the sites of major gene patent battlefields. 
 51 See, eg, Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1) and the definition of invention in sch 1. 
 52 See, eg, ALRC, above n 5, [6.20]–[6.30]. 
 53 (1959) 102 CLR 252 (‘NRDC’). 
 54 Ibid 253 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). 
 55 Patents Act, 35 USC §101 (1952). 
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this test. In the seminal US Supreme Court case of Diamond v Chakrabarty, 
Burger CJ, delivering the majority judgment, noted that laws of nature, physical 
phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable.56 
Under UK patent law, the concept of invention is not defined. Section 1(1) of 
the Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 3757 provides that a patent may only be granted for 
an invention that satisfies the patentability requirements. A list of matters that are 
not inventions for the purposes of the Act are provided in s 1(2): 
(2) anything which consists of — 
(a) a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method; 
(b) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic 
creation whatsoever; 
(c) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a 
game or doing business, or a program for a computer; 
(d) the presentation of information; 
but … only to the extent that a patent or application for a patent relates to 
that thing as such. 
There has been extensive debate as to the interpretation of the wording of 
s 1(2) and equivalent provisions in other European jurisdictions, although the 
law now appears settled. Clearly, the listed matters themselves will be excluded 
from patenting, but the phrases ‘only to the extent that’ and ‘relates to that thing 
as such’ indicate that the excluded material can, nevertheless, be used as the 
substratum of a patentable claim embracing the excluded material.58 Further-
more, things excluded from patentability through s 1(2) can contribute to the 
‘inventive step’ requirement to make the invention patentable.59 
2 Exclusions 
Outside of the limitations on patenting imposed by the invention, patentability 
and disclosure requirements, TRIPS allows certain things to be expressly 
excluded from patent law in member states: 
 Article 27.2: Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law. 
 Article 27.3: Members may also exclude from patentability: 
 (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of  
  humans or animals; 
 
 56 447 US 303, 309 (1980) (‘Chakrabarty’). 
 57 The UK, together with most other European states, is a signatory to the Convention on the Grant 
of European Patents, opened for signature 5 October 1973, 1065 UNTS 254 (entered into force 
7 October 1977) (‘European Patent Convention’), which prescribes the requirements for the 
patent laws of all signatory states. Hence, European patent law is significantly more harmonised 
than most other states. 
 58 See, eg, the English Court of Appeal decision in Genentech Inc’s Patent [1989] RPC 147, 194 
(Purchas LJ) (‘Genentech’). 
 59 Ibid. 
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 (b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially  
  biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes. … 
The exclusions are not mandatory, but they provide a complete codification as 
to what can legitimately be excluded by member states. They are based on the 
exclusions under the European Patent Convention and in the legislation of its 
signatory states.60 For present purposes, the key TRIPS exclusions are those in 
arts 27.2 and 27.3(a). These exclusions are not expressly included in US or 
Australian legislation. Furthermore, recent Australian judicial decisions have 
confirmed that there is no case law supporting exclusion of diagnostic, therapeu-
tic and surgical methods.61 However, the case law relating to a public policy or 
morality exclusion is less clear. Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, 23 
Jac 1, c 3 stated that certain matters are not to be considered manners of new 
manufacture, including those that are ‘generally inconvenient’. The Australian 
Federal Court has confirmed that s 6 has been incorporated in its entirety into the 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth).62 Whether this allows consideration of moral or public 
policy considerations, however, is a moot point.63 
There is one universally-accepted exclusion that could be said to be so obvious 
that it goes without saying: that human beings cannot be patented. In Australia, 
s 18(2) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) expressly excludes human beings, and adds 
that the biological processes for their generation are also not patentable inven-
tions. However, it is doubtful that the exclusion of human beings would extend 
far enough to prohibit human gene sequences. 
3 The Novelty and Inventive Step Requirements  
Logically, patents are only available for new inventions. However, the mere 
fact that something is in existence prior to a patent being filed is not enough to 
destroy novelty: an enabling disclosure is required. Generally, patent law 
requires that challenges to novelty are made on the basis that prior art informa-
tion (what has gone on before in the field — including what is generally known 
and what is written) disclosing all of the features of the invention has been made 
publicly available. Australian law requires that this prior art information exist in 
a single document, or in the doing of a single act, or in two or more related 
documents or acts.64 
Inventive step (non-obviousness in US law) also requires an analysis of the 
prior art. The question is whether the teachings from the prior art make the 
invention obvious to an ordinary person skilled in the field. In Australia, for 
example, the question to be addressed is whether the invention would have been 
obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art, having regard to the common 
 
 60 See, eg, Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, ss 1(3) (the art 27.2 exclusion where the French words 
‘ordre public’ are replaced by the words ‘public policy’), 4(2) (the art 27.3(b) exclusion). 
 61 See, eg, Bristol-Myers Squibb v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 524. 
 62 Ibid. See also Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205; rev’d (1994) 50 
FCR 1. 
 63 Miranda Forsyth, ‘Biotechnology, Patents and Public Policy: A Proposal for Reform in Australia’ 
(2000) 11 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 202, 215–18. 
 64 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 7(1), sch 1 (definitions of ‘prior art information’ and ‘prior art base’). 
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general knowledge (what was generally known and used in the field) and prior 
art information that the skilled person could reasonably be expected to have 
ascertained, understood and regarded as relevant.65 
4 The Utility Requirement 
Utility (industrial applicability in European law) requires that the invention has 
some commercial value. In Australia, this requirement is in part dealt with 
through the ‘manner of manufacture’ test in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 
s 18(1)(a), as interpreted in NRDC. There is also a usefulness ground,66 but this 
is not examined prior to grant, and it requires only that the invention does what it 
was intended to do and that the end in itself is useful. Commercial practicality or 
viability is not a necessary requirement, except that if a particular result is 
claimed, that result must be achievable.67 In the US, on the other hand, the test is 
much more stringent, requiring evidence of specific, substantial and credible 
utility.68 
5 Patent Scope and Disclosure Requirements 
Patents have two components: the specification, which describes the invention, 
and the claims, which mark out the boundaries of the patent. The scope of patent 
claims is determined by the wording used. However, the patent is not necessarily 
limited to the literal wording of the claims. Australian and European courts apply 
a purposive construction when interpreting the claims.69 In the US, the doctrine 
of equivalents performs a similar function.70 There are still strict limits on the 
breadth of claims and the extent to which the precise language used in the claims 
can be further broadened through the rules of interpretation. 
Disclosure requirements prescribe that the invention must be fully disclosed in 
the specification, including the best method of performance. Failure to do so 
means that the patent may be invalid. The language of disclosure varies between 
jurisdictions. In the US, there is a written description requirement.71 In Australia, 
the requirements are referred to as sufficiency, clarity (lack of ambiguity) and 
fair basing.72 In the UK, the language of sufficiency is used.73 
 
 65 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 7(2), (3). 
 66 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1)(c). 
 67 Rehm v Websters Security Systems (1988) 81 ALR 79, 96 (Gummow J); Rescare Ltd v Anaes-
thetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205, 231 (Gummow J). 
 68 Brenner v Manson, 383 US 519 (1966). More recent developments on the law relating to utility 
are discussed below in Part IV(D). 
 69 In Australia, see especially Populin v HB Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 471; Flexible Steel 
Lacing Co v Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331. In the UK, see Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & 
Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183; Kirin-Amgen [2005] 1 All ER 667. 
 70 Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co Inc v Linde Air Products Co, 339 US 605 (1950). Problems 
with the US doctrine were highlighted in Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co 
Ltd, 234 F 3d 558 (Fed Cir, 2000). 
 71 Patents Act, 35 USC §112 (1952). 
 72 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40. 
 73 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, s 14. 
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B  Do Genes Cross the Invention Threshold? 
As previously noted, TRIPS prescribes that patents shall be available for any 
inventions. Patent laws recognise that discoveries are not inventions, either 
expressly (in Europe) or through statutory interpretation.74 However, the task of 
distinguishing between discoveries and inventions is not at all straightforward, 
particularly when the subject matter is derived from the natural world. Intui-
tively, products of nature, including naturally-occurring genes, proteins and 
living organisms would seem to fall clearly under the discovery label. But even 
though such discoveries might not be patentable, patents can be claimed for 
methods embracing discoveries, or for products of discoveries, provided that 
they fulfil the other patenting requirements.75 So, for example, even if the 
identification of a naturally-occurring gene is classified as a discovery, the 
utilisation of that knowledge to make a synthetic gene and gene products could 
still be characterised as a patentable invention. 
A turning point for patenting in this area came in 1980 with the US Supreme 
Court decision in Chakrabarty, which allowed a patent for a bacterium that had 
been modified so that it could break down hydrocarbons. The patent application 
included a number of claims including a claim to the bacterium itself. This 
particular claim was rejected by the patent examiner on the basis that mi-
cro-organisms are products of nature and that, as living things, they are not 
patentable subject matter. 
Burger CJ held that the task in this case was a narrow one of statutory con-
struction and that the question was whether the bacterium was a manufacture or 
composition of matter. His Honour referred to the words of Thomas Jefferson, 
author of the first US Patent Act in 1793, who said that ‘ingenuity should receive 
liberal encouragement’,76 and to the Committee reports accompanying the 1952 
Act indicating an intention that patentable subject matter include ‘anything under 
the sun that is made by man.’77 Burger CJ concluded that a broad construction of 
the legislation was supported both by this legislative history and also by the 
express words of the statute, particularly the word ‘any’. In this light, his Honour 
held that Chakrabarty’s micro-organism plainly qualified, as he had 
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discov-
ery is not nature’s handiwork but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter under §101.78 
 
 74 See, eg, Lane-Fox v Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co Ltd [1892] 3 Ch 424. 
 75 In Australia, in Rank Hovis McDougall Ltd’s Application (1976) 46 AOJP 3915 the Assistant 
Commissioner of Patents granted a patent for a new strain of micro-organism that could be used 
in a process for the production of an edible protein. The process itself was patentable, however, a 
patent was refused for the original micro-organism because it was naturally occurring. See also 
IP Australia, Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedure (2005) vol 2 [8.2.2], 
[8.2.5.3], [8.2.14] <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/resources/manuals_patents2.shtml>. 
 76 447 US 303, 308 (1980). 
 77 Ibid 309. 
 78 Ibid 310. 
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The decision in Chakrabarty has been widely accepted as correctly stating the 
law, both in the US and other jurisdictions.79 The holding in Chakrabarty has 
been interpreted expansively by the US Patent and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’) 
and courts, facilitating the patenting of a wide range of biotechnological inven-
tions. The only requirement to bring material that has been isolated or purified 
under the umbrella of patentable subject matter would seem to be that it offers 
some material advantage in utility over the naturally-occurring material.80 
In Australia, there is no court decision that explicitly considers whether gene 
sequences are inventions or discoveries.81 However, this issue was considered by 
the Deputy Commissioner of Patents in Kirin-Amgen Inc v Board of Regents of 
University of Washington82 in opposition proceedings against Kirin-Amgen’s 
EPO patent. The Deputy Commissioner accepted that a claim directed to 
naturally-occurring DNA would likely be claiming no more than a discovery per 
se and not be a manner of manufacture. However, it was sufficient that the patent 
claimed a purified and isolated sequence. It was held that these claims did not 
extend to the naturally-occurring chromosome, or any other naturally-occurring 
entity. But by being directed to a purified and isolated DNA sequence, they 
claimed ‘an artificially created state of affairs’, even though the sequence itself 
was claimed. 
Similarly, a Patent Office fact sheet on the patenting of biotechnology inven-
tions provides the following guidance: 
although standard patents can be obtained for biological material such as microor-
ganisms, nucleic acids, peptides and organelles, this material is only patentable if it 
has been isolated from its natural environment, or has been synthetically or recom-
binantly produced. For example, DNA or genes in the human body are not pat-
entable, however, a DNA or gene sequence which has been isolated from the human 
may be patentable.  
Patent specifications must also describe a specific use for biological material. For 
example, if the invention relates to a gene, the specification must disclose a specific 
use for the gene such as its use in the diagnosis or treatment of a specific disease or 
its use in a specific enzymatic reaction or industrial process.83 
The law on this matter awaits definitive judicial pronouncement in Australia. 
 
 79 See, eg, Jeffrey L Ihnen, ‘Patenting Biotechnology: A Practical Approach’ (1985) 11 Rutgers 
Computer and Technology Law Journal 407, 409. 
 80 This distinction is illustrated by a 1993 case in which an anonymous applicant unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain a patent for a DNA sequence produced by normal cells. See the discussion of 
this case in Goldstein and Golod, above n 40, 1316. 
 81 Chakrabarty was referred to with approval by the Australian High Court in Grain Pool of 
Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 502 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), 532 (Kirby J). See also Matthew Rimmer, ‘Franklin Barley: 
Patent Law and Plant Breeders’ Rights’ (2003) 10(4) E Law — Murdoch University Electronic 
Journal of Law [12] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n4/rimmer104.html>. 
 82 (1995) 33 IPR 557. The later court decision in the same case did not consider this issue: see 
Genetics Institute (1998) 156 ALR 30. For further discussion of this and other Patent Office 
decisions of similar vintage, see Charles Lawson and Catherine Pickering, ‘Patenting Genetic 
Materials — Failing to Reflect the Value of Variation in DNA, RNA and Amino Acids’ (2000) 11 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 69. 
 83 IP Australia, Australian Patents for Biological Inventions (2005) 2 <http://www.ipaustralia.gov. 
au/pdfs/patents/specific/biotech.pdf>. 
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In analysing the situation in Europe, we must recall two features of European 
patent law: discoveries are explicitly excluded, but they can form the substratum 
of valid claims. On this basis, gene sequences might be excluded from patenting 
if they are classified as being discoveries.84 But if some sort of practical applica-
tion — which need not of itself be novel or non-obvious — is claimed, this will 
be patentable. 
In the case of Genentech, the English Court of Appeal concluded that the mere 
identification of the gene sequence for human tissue plasminogen activator 
protein was a discovery, but that methods embracing the sequence could be 
patentable (provided that they were clearly identified and defined), and that 
inventive step could reside in the production of the sequence itself.85 Thus, the 
Court held that a DNA sequence itself is a discovery, but the incorporation of the 
DNA sequence into an expression vector could have been patentable if the 
production of the sequence was not obvious. The Court was divided, however, on 
the issue of obviousness. 
The implications of the Genentech interpretation are illustrated in a more 
recent case involving Kirin-Amgen’s UK patent for EPO.86 In this particular 
case, Kirin-Amgen was pursuing a number of parties for infringing its EPO 
patent, including the TKT group, which had found a mechanism to activate the 
EPO gene in situ in a human cell. This is different from what Kirin-Amgen was 
doing: they had taken the EPO gene from a human cell and introduced it into the 
cell of another mammal (a hamster) via a bacterial vector, using standard 
recombinant procedures. Recombinant DNA technology was also utilised by 
TKT, but the gene sequence expressing EPO was not itself recombined. 
Recalling that Kirin-Amgen’s European claim referred to expression in a ‘host 
cell’, Kirin-Amgen attempted to argue that this claim covered any DNA se-
quence that caused EPO to be expressed, whether exogenous or endogenous, 
provided that some form of recombinant DNA technology had been applied to 
the cell. In effect, this argument would have required a finding by the House of 
Lords that Kirin-Amgen had exclusive rights to the EPO DNA sequence, 
whether in recombinant or natural form, or that it had exclusive rights to all 
industrial uses of the EPO sequence (or at least the application utilised by the 
TKT group). The House of Lords refused to accept either interpretation. On the 
question of Kirin-Amgen’s claim to the EPO sequence, Lord Hoffmann followed 
Genentech, holding that the gene sequence information itself was not an inven-
tion, but merely a discovery regarding information about the natural world.87 For 
his Lordship, Kirin-Amgen’s invention was a way of making EPO, not the DNA 
sequence coding for EPO itself, and although the sequence information lay at the 
heart of the invention, it was not the invention. Hence, while the patent as 
claimed might have covered recombinant DNA processes that involved taking a 
 
 84 We will come back to this crucial point again shortly. See also Bostyn, above n 35, 12–16. 
 85 The patent was held to be invalid by all three judges, but for different reasons. It appears that 
Mustill LJ was even somewhat reluctant to accept the proposition that methods embracing dis-
coveries are patentable: [1989] RPC 147, 268–9. 
 86 Kirin-Amgen [2005] 1 All ER 667. 
 87 Ibid 691.  
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sequence from one cell and placing it in another cell where it would express 
EPO, it did not cover any conceivable use of the EPO DNA sequence unless that 
use fell within the legitimate scope of the invention as claimed. We shall see that 
the House of Lords did not accept that the TKT group’s use came within the 
scope of the claims, and further concluded that some of the claims in the patent 
were actually invalid. 
To give a full picture of UK law on this point, the Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions88 also needs to be considered. The 
Directive is an annexure to the European Patent Convention, provided for the 
purpose of assisting examiners, courts and applicants for biotechnology patents 
in determining the validity of those patents. In art 5, the Directive states: 
1 The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, 
and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or 
partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions. 
2 An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by 
means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence 
of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of 
that element is identical to that of a natural element.89  
As a necessary consequence of art 5(2), it seems that gene sequence claims can 
be made in Europe. However, if they are to be enforceable they must be strictly 
limited to the isolated sequence in order to comply with art 5(1). It has been 
argued that these two provisions are conflicting. As the Danish Council of Ethics 
states: ‘You cannot simultaneously forbid patents on the human body or elements 
thereof and then permit a sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, albeit 
isolated from the human body, to be patented.’90 
Nevertheless, it does appear that if patent holders can find ways to restrict their 
claims to isolated DNA sequences, such claims should not be invalidated by 
art 5(1). How, then, can art 5(2) be reconciled with the Genentech and Kirin-Am-
gen decisions?91 Lord Hoffmann himself provided an answer to this question, 





 88 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions [1998] OJ L 213/13 (‘Biotechnology Directive’). See 
also Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Development and Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Bio-
technology and Genetic Engineering (2002) <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2002/ 
com2002_0545en01.pdf>; Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament: Development and Implications of Patent Law 
in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (2005) (‘European Commission Second 
Report’) <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/invent/com_2005_312fin 
al_en.pdf>. 
 89 (Emphasis added). 
 90 Danish Council of Ethics, above n 35, 24. Cf Kingdom of the Netherlands v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union (C-377/98) [2001] ECR I-7079, I-7106–9 (Ad-
vocate General Jacobs). See also Bostyn, above n 35, 40–4. 
 91 It should be noted that although Kirin-Amgen was heard after the Biotechnology Directive was 
finalised, it was decided under old law. 
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sequence, whether exogenous or endogenous, which expresses EPO in conse-
quence of the application to the cell of any form of DNA recombinant technol-
ogy.’92 
His Lordship added that whether the specification would have been sufficient 
to support it is another matter. The problem for Kirin-Amgen was that because it 
did not make this claim, it needed to argue that the sequence information was the 
invention itself, rather than merely being included in the patent as claimed. 
In the US to date, there is no evidence that the courts will interpret sequence 
claims with quite the same stringency as the House of Lords in like cases. The 
lack of relevant case law in Australia makes it difficult to predict how Australian 
courts might interpret like claims. 
In summary, it is generally recognised that claims including DNA sequences 
that have been isolated from their natural environment can satisfy the invention 
threshold, but that naturally-occurring sequences are discoveries. However, this 
distinction could be regarded as purely semantic, having no real practical 
application. This is because a claim made over an isolated sequence could be 
argued to extend to include other industrial uses of the naturally-occurring 
sequence as well (for example, endogenous activation by means of a technical 
process). As a result of the UK decisions, it appears that gene sequence patent 
holders will bear the heavy onus of showing how their claims are limited to the 
isolated sequence. If patent holders fail in discharging this onus, their sequence 
claims will be invalid. 
C  Is It Permissible to Exclude Genes from Patenting? 
1 Ordre Public or Morality 
So far, this article has focused primarily on the impact of gene patents on 
innovation. However, the debate about gene patenting goes much deeper than 
this, particularly in the areas of ethics and social policy. Objections to gene 
patenting range from the belief that there is something fundamentally unethical 
or immoral about gene patenting per se, because genes are part of the common 
heritage of humankind, through to concerns that genetic research, particularly 
research involving human genetic material, should not be commodified, and 
concerns about the impact of gene patenting on access to health care. Each of 
these concerns has merit, and none should be dismissed lightly. However, an 
in-depth discussion regarding the ethics and social policy of gene patents extends 
beyond the scope of this article. The point here is to examine the legality of gene 
patents and this requires some analysis of the extent to which it is possible to 
consider ethics and social policy within the current legal framework or within a 
suitably reformed framework. On the question of law reform, it should be noted 
that there have been a number of public inquiries and reviews on these issues 
around the world, none of which have resulted in recommendations to exclude 
genes from patenting on social or ethical grounds.93 
 
 92 Kirin-Amgen [2005] 1 All ER 667, 692. 
 93 See, eg, ALRC, above n 5, [7.81]. The ALRC concluded that it is better to regulate research 
activities directly than to address ethical and social concerns by excluding the subject matter, 
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Courts and Patent Offices have generally expressed reluctance to engage in 
public policy and morality debates unless they are specifically enjoined to do so. 
The US Supreme Court in Chakrabarty was asked to consider the policy 
arguments, particularly the potential hazards of the technology. In response, 
Burger CJ stated: 
We are without competence to entertain these arguments — either to brush 
them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them. 
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution 
within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and 
study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot.94 
In a similar vein, Finkelstein J in the Australian case of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb v F H Faulding & Co Ltd stated that: ‘Judges should not be called upon 
to resolve moral questions and, speaking generally, legal principles are not to be 
ascertained by reference to standards of ethics or morality.’95 Thus, even though 
the general inconvenience exclusion is incorporated into the Patents Act 1990 
(Cth) following s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, 23 Jac 1, c 3, and despite 
suggestions that this provision could be interpreted to require consideration of 
public policy or moral issues,96 it seems unlikely that unless directed, the courts 
or the Patent Office would be willing to enter into such debates. The situation is 
different in Europe and a number of other jurisdictions,97 where patent offices 
and judges are required to consider these matters. The ordre public or morality 
exclusion has been considered by the European patent authorities in a series of 
biotechnology patent decisions, two of which are considered below. 
In Plant Genetic Systems , 98 the patent claimed processes and plants involving 
genetic modification for the production of an enzyme capable of neutralising or 
inactivating a herbicide. The Board of Appeals of the European Patent Office 
held that the concept of ordre public covers the protection of public security and 
the physical integrity of individuals as part of society, encompassing also the 
protection of the environment. As such, inventions should be excluded where 
their exploitation is likely to breach public peace or social order (for example an 
act of terrorism) or seriously prejudice the environment. The Board said that 
 
and further that the social and ethical concerns that are raised by the use or exploitation of pat-
ented inventions are better addressed by specific measures to facilitate use: at [7.84]–[7.88]. The 
Nuffield Council, while recommending that patents asserting rights over DNA sequences should 
be the ‘exception rather than the norm’, saw that the avenues for achieving this end were by 
discouraging the granting of certain patents and rigorously applying the patent criteria, rather 
than by exclusion: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 35, xi–xii. Similarly, the Danish 
Council of Ethics recommended that it should not be possible to award broad gene patents but 
that, despite the special status of genes, it should continue to be possible to obtain gene patents 
in future: Danish Council of Ethics, above n 35, 100–1. 
 94 Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 316–17 (1980). 
 95 (2000) 97 FCR 524, 559–60.  
 96 There is some authority for this proposition. See, eg, Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 
CLR 611, 623, in which Barwick CJ held that if we were to have an exclusion for methods of 
medical treatment, it would be on ethical grounds, through general inconvenience. Forsyth, 
above n 63, 209–11 also makes a strong case for the introduction of public policy considerations 
using general inconvenience. 
 97 Including, in the Australasian region, Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
 98 [1995] EPOR 357. 
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serious prejudice to the environment must be sufficiently substantiated at the 
time the decision is made about whether or not to grant or revoke the patent. In 
this case, arguments were based on the possibility of some undesired effect in the 
future, but this was not sufficient to substantiate revocation. The Board held that 
morality relates to the belief that some behaviour is right and acceptable while 
other behaviour is wrong, based on the accepted norms of conduct of a particular 
culture. On analysis, the Board determined that with regard to the morality issue: 
‘plant biotechnology per se cannot be regarded as being more contrary to 
morality than traditional selective breeding’.99 
Howard Florey/Relaxin100 involved a patent application by the Howard Florey 
Institute in Australia, concerning the molecular cloning and characterisation of a 
gene sequence coding for human relaxin. Relaxin is a hormone secreted by 
pregnant women. Green members of the European Parliament opposed the patent 
and urged the Opposition Division of the European Patent Office to accept their 
argument that the patent was contrary to the immorality provision. They argued 
that the patent was an affront to human dignity, on the basis that the isolation of 
the gene requires tissue to be taken from pregnant women; that it amounted to a 
modern form of slavery, on the basis that it involves dismemberment of women 
and their piecemeal sale; and that the patenting of human genes equates to the 
patenting of human life, which is intrinsically immoral. 
The Opposition Division indicated that the function of this provision is to 
ensure that patents are not granted for inventions that would universally be 
regarded as outrageous. As such, it is only invoked in rare and extreme cases. 
The Opposition Division was not persuaded that this was such a case, holding 
that: 
• use of donated ovarian tissue to extract the gene was no more immoral than 
use of donated blood as a source of life saving substances. Further the isola-
tion procedure need not be repeated as the gene, once sequenced, can be 
chemically synthesised; 
• ownership of the patent is not akin to slavery because it does not give the 
owner any right whatsoever to individual human beings, but merely the right 
to exclude for a limited period of time third parties from commercially using 
the patented invention. 
• DNA is not life, rather a chemical substance that carries genetic information. 
The Division saw no moral distinction in principle between patenting human 
genes on the one hand, and other human substances on the other. 
Article 6 of the Biotechnology Directive reproduces the ordre public or moral-
ity exclusion and provides, in para 2, a narrow list of the types of inventions that 
shall be considered unpatentable: 
 (a) processes for cloning human beings; 
 (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
 (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; 
 
 99 Ibid 369 (Examiners Kinkeldey, Galligani and Moser). 
100 [1995] EPOR 541. 
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 (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to 
cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or 
animal, and also animals resulting from such processes. 
Given the decided cases and the wording of the Biotechnology Directive, it 
would appear that the ordre public or morality exclusion is considerably limited 
in scope. There may well be some specific cases that succeed, based on argu-
ments that serious prejudice to the environment could result from the exploita-
tion of the invention or that the invention is likely to cause serious risks to 
human life or health. However, these cases must be thought of as most rare. 
In conclusion, therefore, the legality of gene patenting does not appear to have 
been compromised in any substantive way by public policy and morality 
arguments to date. Moreover, law reform proposals do not provide a strong 
foundation on which to build such arguments in the future. 
2 Diagnostic, Therapeutic and Surgical Methods 
A provision for the exclusion of gene patents of this nature might exclude 
methods of clinical diagnosis of genetic conditions, but would not exclude 
diagnostic products, test kits, reagents and the like. Hence, it is likely to be of 
limited value, and in Australia the ALRC was not convinced that there was 
sufficient justification to recommend amendment of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 
in this respect.101 
D  How Do Genes Fulfil the Standard Patent Requirements? 
1 Novelty 
Because patent law requires that challenges to novelty are made on the basis 
that prior art information disclosing all of the features of the invention has been 
made publicly available, the isolation and characterisation of a gene outside of 
its natural environment will make it novel.102 The rationale for this conclusion is 
that, prior to this, the gene sequence information was not publicly available. 
While there will always be disputes between competitors as to who was the first 
to disclose an invention and whether follow-on inventions satisfy the novelty 
requirement, until recently novelty had not engendered the same level of debate 
as inventive step and utility. 
However, the House of Lords decision in Kirin-Amgen raises an important 
novelty issue. In that case, the House of Lords accepted the European Patent 
Office practice that product-by-process claims could not be made unless the 
product itself was new, being different from any existing product in the state of 
the art, and that this difference could not be described in chemical or physical 
terms.103 One of Kirin-Amgen’s claims was to ‘a polypeptide product of the 
expression … of a DNA sequence’.104 The Lords did not accept that this was 
 
101 ALRC, above n 5, ch 21. Even in Europe, where such method patents are excluded, the 
exclusion is limited to methods performed on the human body, which would not exclude genetic 
testing carried out on bodily samples removed from the body: see Bostyn, above n 35, 77–9. 
102 See Bostyn, above n 35, 17–18, 44–6.  
103 Kirin Amgen [2005] 1 All ER 667, 694 (Lord Hoffmann). 
104 Ibid 676. 
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sufficiently different from naturally-occurring EPO, or that the different method 
of manufacturing was sufficient to make it new. Consequently, the claim was 
held to be invalid on the ground of anticipation.105 
2  Inventive Step 
Arguably, the techniques used to isolate and characterise genes are now so 
routine that very little inventive ingenuity is required to describe a new gene. In 
particular, the use of computer technology has dramatically improved the ease 
and speed of gene identification. However, in the US, the inventive step re-
quirement has been interpreted liberally for gene sequences. The focus is placed 
on the invention itself rather than the techniques for its production. This means 
that the focus of inquiry for gene patents is whether the gene sequence is 
obvious, not whether the method used to obtain it was obvious to try. 
The US courts have accepted that the degeneracy of the genetic code means 
that until the claimed molecules are actually isolated and purified, it would have 
been highly unlikely that a person skilled in the area could have contemplated 
what was obtained. In Re Bell,106 for example, DNA and RNA sequences coding 
for human insulin-like growth factors (‘hIGF’) were claimed. The prior art 
provided a reference to amino acid sequences for certain hIGF, and a patent 
disclosing the general method for isolating a gene when the amino acid sequence 
was known. The Court of Appeals held that the degeneracy of the genetic code 
meant that there are vast numbers of DNA sequences that might code for a 
specific protein (in this example, the estimate given was 1036). Therefore, it was 
concluded that prior disclosure of amino acid sequences and general sequencing 
methods did not render the claimed sequences obvious. Similar findings were 
made in Re Deuel, although the Court did recognise that the situation might be 
different where a protein is of a sufficiently small size and simplicity that only a 
small number of DNA sequences will code for it.107 
In Europe, on the other hand, the focus is on whether the isolation of the gene 
was obvious. The test is whether the technique used to obtain the sequence 
information was ‘obvious to try’.108 Dillon LJ in Genentech provided some early 
guidance as to the interpretation of the inventive step test to gene patents in the 
UK. His Lordship held that on the facts of this case, it was obvious to the person 
skilled in the art to set out to produce human tissue plasminogen activator by 
recombinant DNA technology. Whether the person skilled in the art actually had 
the ability to perform the task was irrelevant. Consequently, he concluded that 
there was nothing by way of inventive step to support the claims in the patent.109 
Since Genentech, other decisions in Europe have confirmed that a recombinant 
DNA sequence will be obvious if it can be shown that all the techniques needed 
 
105 Ibid 696. 
106 991 F 2d 781, 1529 (Lourie J) (Fed Cir, 1993). 
107 51 F 3d 1552 (Fed Cir, 1995). 
108 UK Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Biotechnological 
Inventions in the UK Patent Office (2005) 9–10 <http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/reference/bio 
techguide/biotech.pdf>.  
109 Genentech [1989] RPC 147, 235. 
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to produce it were well known.110 Hence, in silico gene identification or ‘data 
mining’ by computerised matching of unknown human gene sequences to 
homologous animal gene sequences would be obvious.111 As the UK Patent 
Office states: 
a sequence may be shown to lack inventive step and that is where an earlier dis-
closure points to the inevitability of arriving at a particular sequence even 
though the actual structure of the sequence is not determined until sometime 
later.112 
While the courts in Australia have not been given the opportunity to address 
this issue with respect to gene sequence patents, recent High Court authority 
suggests that the US approach would be favoured in Australia. In Aktiebolaget 
Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd, the High Court rejected the notion that obvious-
ness is determined by considering whether or not something is obvious to try, 
instead affirming that the relevant inquiry is whether the invention itself is 
obvious.113 The Court based its decision on the precise wording of the Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth) s 7(2): ‘whether an invention would have been obvious’. 
The leniency of the US test has been subject to intensive criticism, both within 
the US,114 and internationally,115 because it essentially means that any invention 
disclosing a gene sequence will satisfy the inventive step requirement, and that 
gene patents are per se non-obvious. Ultimately legislative reform may be 
necessary in the US and Australia (depending on how the inventive step test is 
applied in that country), but in the interim it is highly desirable for patent 
examiners to be provided with new administrative guidelines requiring them to 
look more closely at the level of inventive ingenuity involved in solving the 
technical problem.116 
3 Utility 
The EST patent applications filed by the NIH in the US in 1991 led to a flurry 
of statements as to the utility of partial sequences and sequences of unknown 
function. The common trend that has emerged around the world is that raw 
sequence data is not generally considered to be patentable, because it fails to 
satisfy the utility requirement. In the US, new utility guidelines published in 
2001 confirm that specific, substantial and credible utility of the claimed 
invention must be demonstrated in the application.117 In summary, these re-
quirements will only be satisfied where the applicant shows that the utility is 
 
110 For a review of the relevant case law, see UK Patent Office, above n 108, 9–10. 
111 Ibid 2–3. 
112 Ibid 7. 
113 (2002) 212 CLR 411, 429 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
114 See, eg, Stephen A Merrill, Richard C Levin and Mark B Myers (eds), A Patent System for the 
21st Century (2004) 92 <http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf>. 
115 See, eg, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 35, 30. 
116 Similarly, in the US, the National Research Council recommended that the USPTO and the 
Federal Circuit should abandon the so-called ‘per se’ rule announced in Re Bell and Re Deuel 
that prevents consideration of the technical difficulty faced in obtaining pre-existing gene se-
quences and consider the approach in other industrialised countries: Merrill, Levin and Myers, 
above n 114, 95. 
117 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed Reg 1092, 1095 (2001). 
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specific to the claimed subject matter, which has a ‘real world’ application that is 
credible to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This requirement will be met for 
gene sequence patents if the function of the sequence is disclosed. Hence, as a 
general rule, it would seem to be most unlikely that EST patent claims could 
fulfil the US utility requirement. 
Article 5(3) of the Biotechnology Directive requires that industrial applicability 
for gene patents is disclosed in the patent application. The extent to which this 
provision actually imposes more stringent obligations than the usual industrial 
applicability requirement in European patent law remains open to debate.118 The 
Australian Patent Office similarly considers that patentable sequences must have 
a definite industrial use.119 However, there is no express requirement for 
specific, substantial and credible utility to be demonstrated by the applicant for a 
patent. A review of Australian patent law in 2000 recommended that the ‘manner 
of manufacture’ test should be retained, but that the Patent Office should adopt 
the examination practice of requiring specific, substantial and credible utility.120 
Subsequently, the ALRC recommended that these requirements should be 
expressly incorporated into the Patents Act 1990 (Cth).121 
These developments in the law relating to utility would seem to alleviate 
concerns that EST patents could be granted for speculative use as mere research 
tools. Indeed, there has been some suggestion in the literature that the EST 
patenting debate became a dead issue following the publication of the US 
guidelines.122 However, until recently, it was still unclear exactly how much 
utility would need to be disclosed for an EST to be patentable.123 For example, 
Barton has suggested that it may be possible for the utility requirement to be 
satisfied for ‘consisting of’ claims if the EST can be used to fish out the full gene 
sequence and to make the protein.124 
The recent US Court of Appeals decision in Re Fisher,125 which involved 
claims to five ESTs isolated from maize leaves, has provided some much-needed 
clarification. The patent claimed various different uses of the ESTs, including as 
molecular markers for mapping the entire maize genome. The Court considered 
the specific and substantial components of the utility requirement. The majority 
held that specific utility requires a use that is ‘not so vague as to be meaning-
 
118 See Bostyn, above n 35, 53–5. 
119 IP Australia, above n 83, 2. 
120 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (2000) 151–4. 
121 See ALRC, above n 5, Recommendation 6-3. Article 17(9)(13) of the Australia–US Free Trade 
Agreement also requires that both parties adopt this test. Whilst the Patent Office states that it 
already requires that this test be satisfied, there is little guidance as to how this achieved: ALRC, 
above n 5, 148. 
122 See, eg, John A Robertson, ‘Sequence Patents Are Not the Issue’ (2002) 2(3) American Journal 
of Bioethics 22. 
123 The Nuffield Council, for example, expresses concern that the ‘credibility’ test may be set too 
low if all that is required is ‘theoretical possibility’: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 35, 
31.  
124 Barton, ‘Changing Intellectual Property Issues in the Biotechnology Industry’, above n 11, 7. 
125 421 F 3d 1365 (Fed Cir, 2005). As noted in the decision, the real party in interest is Monsanto 
Technology LLC, owned by the Monsanto Company. 
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less’126 and that provides ‘a well-defined and particular benefit to the public’.127 
Substantial utility requires that the claimed invention ‘has a significant and 
presently available benefit to the public’,128 and ‘not that it may prove useful at 
some future date after further research’.129 The majority concluded that the 
claimed ESTs were ‘no more than research intermediaries that might help 
scientists to isolate the particular underlying protein-encoding genes and conduct 
further experimentation on those genes’130 and that all of the asserted uses 
‘represent merely hypothetical possibilities’.131 As such, for the majority, the 
claimed ESTs were fundamentally different from other patentable research tools, 
such as microscopes.132 This decision lends support to the view that, as a general 
rule, it will be extremely difficult to overcome the utility hurdle for EST claims 
in the US. 
E  What Can Be Claimed and How Much Must Be Disclosed? 
There are many instances where the claims made in a patent are much broader 
than what is actually described in the specification. Take the following examples: 
• where a gene sequence has been described in one species of animal or plant, 
but claimed for many; 
• where one DNA sequence for making a particular protein is described but 
claims are made to the genus of DNA sequences that could produce that pro-
tein, as well as to the genus of amino acid sequences that perform the same 
function; and 
• where all uses of the sequence are claimed, even uses that are unknown or 
unanticipated at the time of the patent application. 
In Australia, the breadth of patent claims for biotechnology inventions was 
considered in Genetics Institute.133 Heerey J held that the claim to the product of 
procaryotic or eucaryotic expression of an exogenous DNA sequence was 
permissibly wide because the DNA sequence for EPO was a principle of general 
application and, therefore, it was acceptable for the claim to be made in corre-
spondingly general terms. In coming to this conclusion, Heerey J cited with 
approval Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc.134 The 
principle of general application test stems from case law relating to patents 
claiming classes of chemicals, in which broad claims to the entire class have 
been allowed provided that a beneficial property common to the class is dis-
 




130 Ibid 1373. 
131 Ibid. 
132 On the other hand, Rader J, in his minority judgment, saw no clear distinction between ESTs and 
microscopes, because both ‘supply information about molecular structure’ and both ‘advance 
research and bring scientists closer to unlocking the secrets of the corn genome to provide better 
food production for the hungry world’: ibid 1380.  
133 (1998) 156 ALR 30. 
134 [1997] RPC 1, 48–9, cited ibid 143–5. 
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closed. Although there have been no other opportunities to consider this issue in 
the Australian courts, the Genetics Institute decision signals that as a general 
rule, broad claims to gene sequences and their products may be accepted when 
the full sequence and a method of isolating it is disclosed. 
The Kirin-Amgen decision in the UK contrasts with the Australian decision in 
Genetics Institute, even though it deals with the exact same invention. It is 
necessary to recall two matters. First, Lord Hoffmann concluded that the patent 
covered a way of making EPO, and not the sequence information coding for 
EPO, which he held was a discovery. Second, the main claim in the European 
patent referred to expression in a ‘host cell’. Based on general principles of 
construction, his Lordship concluded that this required the presence of a ‘guest’, 
which did not include endogenous expression as applied by TKT, and hence 
there was no infringement.135 It is interesting to note that the TKT technology 
would not have come within the scope of the Australian patent because the 
primary claim in Australia was limited to expression of an exogenous DNA 
sequence. In the UK decision, having reached the conclusion that the TKT 
process was not covered by Kirin-Amgen’s claims, Lord Hoffmann did not need 
to rule on the issue of sufficiency of disclosure. However, he intimated that 
because the invention was the method of making EPO and not the sequence 
itself, the facts did not support the exercise of the principle of general applica-
tion. In his Lordship’s view, Kirin-Amgen had not disclosed in general terms all 
possible ways of making EPO using recombinant DNA technology.136 
Whether the principle of general application test will provide adequate guid-
ance in dealing with disclosure and scope of claim issues in all gene patent cases 
in the UK and Australia remains to be seen.137 The case law on disclosure and 
scope of claims is much richer in the US, where there is clear evidence of the 
judiciary’s reluctance to uphold broad patent claims. There have been a number 
of important cases on this point, three of which will be considered.  
In Amgen Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd,138 the Federal Circuit held that 
Amgen could not claim all EPO gene analogues, bearing in mind that EPO has 
165 amino acids, and that over a million analogues could be made by the 
substitution of just three amino acids. The Court held that there must be enabling 
disclosure of other DNA analogues before claims can be made to the DNA 
coding for any polypeptide having similar properties to EPO, stating that: 
A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one, and it is well established 
in our law that conception of a chemical compound requires that the inventor 
be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials and to describe 
how to obtain it … Conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture 






135 Kirin-Amgen [2005] 1 All ER 667, 688. 
136 Ibid 697–9. 
137 Support for this test is provided in Bostyn, above n 35, 31–5. 
138 927 F 2d 1200 (Fed Cir, 1991) (‘Amgen’). 
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preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or whatever characteristics suf-
ficiently distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal bio-
logical property.139 
In Regents of the University of California v Eli Lilly & Co,140 the Court of 
Appeals further clarified two points on the written description requirements in 
the US. First, the Court held that in order to claim a DNA sequence there must be 
written description of the sequence itself. Second, claims to generic sequences 
such as ‘vertebrate insulin cDNA’ or ‘mammalian insulin cDNA’ without more 
were not adequate written descriptions of the genus as they did not distinguish 
the claimed genus from others, except by function. The written description must 
define structural features common to the genus that distinguishes it from others. 
New written description guidelines were released in 2001, confirming the 
decision in Eli Lilly that describing a method for isolating a sequence is insuffi-
cient and that the complete sequence or other identifying features must be 
disclosed.141 Furthermore, if a full sequence is disclosed for one species of a 
DNA sequence, patent rights are only allowed over that sequence. A genus of 
DNA sequences can only be claimed if there is sufficient description of a 
representative number of species. However, the guidelines do state that genus 
claims may be made where there is a written description of a representative 
number of species and other functional characteristics and there is a known or 
disclosed correlation between function and structure.142 
In the 2004 case of Re Wallach,143 the Court of Appeals appeared willing to 
relax somewhat the stringent disclosure requirements prescribed in Amgen, Eli 
Lilly and like cases. The Court held that the state of the art has developed to such 
an extent that ‘the complete amino acid sequence of a protein may put one in 
possession of the genus of DNA sequences encoding it’144. Hence, provided that 
the amino acid sequence of the protein was disclosed, the genus of DNA 
sequences coding for it could also be claimed. In explaining the reason for this 
conclusion, the Court noted that conversion back and forth between an amino 
acid sequence and the DNA sequences encoding it is now routine. This satisfied 
the requirement for there to be a relationship between structure and function 
known to those ordinarily skilled in the art. Nevertheless, the Court held that 
Wallach’s application did not meet the written description requirement because 
only the partial structure of the protein was disclosed. 
 
139 Ibid 1206 (Lourie J). 
140 119 F 3d 1559 (Fed Cir, 1997) (‘Eli Lilly’). 
141 Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 USC 112, ¶ 1, ‘Written 
Description’ Requirement, 66 Fed Reg 1099 (2001). Merrill, Levin and Myers, above n 114, 94, 
note that Eli Lilly could also have an impact on inventive step: ‘By narrowing the scope of some 
gene patents to the actual sequence disclosed it is possible that Eli Lilly might inherently prevent 
patents on some technologically obvious genes for which Bell would otherwise permit a patent.’ 
The passage goes on to say, however, that this is not an adequate solution to the problems asso-
ciated with the current inventive step test in the US. 
142 Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 USC 112, ¶ 1, ‘Written 
Description’ Requirement, 66 Fed Reg 1099, 1106 (2001). See also Enzo Biochem Inc v Gen-
Probe Inc, 296 F 3d 1316 (Fed Cir, 2002). 
143 378 F 3d 1330 (Fed Cir, 2004). 
144 Ibid 1333 (Lourie J). 
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Together, the developing body of case law and administrative guidelines have 
done much to clarify the written description requirement as it relates to gene 
patents in the US, placing sensible limitations on the scope of such claims. It 
clearly indicates that EST patents with comprising claims are likely to be invalid. 
However, the law in this area remains more uncertain in other jurisdictions. 
V  CONCLUSION:  PROPER AND CERTAIN GENE PATENTING? 
This analysis has shown that, despite the growing body of jurisprudence in this 
area, clear guidance as to the legality of gene patents remains elusive. There is 
still ambiguity and uncertainty, particularly with regard to the ambit of the 
inventive step, utility and disclosure tests and the distinction between inventions 
and discoveries. Consequently, would it be best simply to exclude genes from 
patenting? Although there continue to be calls in the academic commentary for 
this,145 there is little support for it in the policy and law reform debates, and it is 
probably not within the realms of possibility that such an exclusion will be 
recognised at this time. Admittedly, though, the House of Lords decision in 
Kirin-Amgen has reopened the debate in that jurisdiction.146 On this question of 
whether or not claims over gene sequences should be patentable in Australia, the 
ALRC has pointed out that: 
Whatever the merits of that argument, the Inquiry was faced with the fact that 
since the 1980s — in Australia and internationally — large numbers of patents 
have been granted on genetic sequences, provided they have been isolated from 
their natural state and otherwise satisfy the statutory requirements for pat-
entability. The Inquiry ultimately concluded that if there had been a time to rec-
ommend that gene sequences should not be patentable, that time had long since 
passed. Rather, it was preferable to focus on reforms that would make the sys-
tem work better.147 
This is not to say that all is well with gene patent law. As stated at the start of 
this article, and as widely acknowledged in gene patent debates, patent law 
should set proper and certain boundaries on what is and what is not patentable.148 
In particular: 
• the novelty, inventive step and utility requirements must be set at a suitably 
high standard to ensure on the one hand that true inventors are appropriately 
rewarded for their inventive ingenuity and on the other hand that others are 
not given too great a reward for trivial or routine improvements over the prior 
art; and 
• gene patents should be of an appropriate breadth. If patents are too broad, 
then a single patent holder may have too great a control over a whole area of 
 
145 See, eg, Luigi Palombi, ‘The Impact of TRIPS on the Validity of the European Biotechnology 
Directive’ (2005) 2 Journal of International Biotechnology Law 62. 
146 R Stephen Crespi, ‘Erythropoietin in the UK: A Setback for Gene Patents?’ (2005) 23 Nature 
Biotechnology 367. 
147 ALRC, above n 5, 13. 
148 On the importance of granting high quality patents, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges (2004) 28–9. 
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research, but if they are too narrow a patent thicket could more likely arise, 
requiring multiple licences to be entered into to ensure the freedom to oper-
ate. 
Does it matter that after all these years there is still uncertainty with regard to 
these matters? Significant steps have been taken in clarifying the law, both 
through judicial decisions and through legislative and administrative guidelines, 
particularly with regard to the utility and the disclosure requirements. The 
majority decision in Re Fisher is particularly important, and would seem to 
finally put to rest concerns about the legality of EST patents.149 The inventive 
step requirement remains problematic in the US and Australia, and steps need to 
be taken to adopt a more stringent test, akin to that used in Europe. The introduc-
tion of use- or purpose-bound restrictions on claiming also warrants further 
scrutiny.150 But further legislative reform is not necessarily the best option at this 
stage. For the most part, the gene patents that have been discussed in this article 
were issued in the 1980s and 1990s at the start of the biotechnology revolution, 
and many were overly broad. But this tends to be the case in any new area of 
technology. As more patents are granted in a new field, their scope necessarily 
decreases in order to satisfy the patentability criteria.151 On this basis, the 
European Commission has recently concluded that: ‘it may be questionable 
whether attempting to further refine the scope of protection of gene sequence 
patents in the light of divergences between national legislations will have any 
significant effect on actors in the field.’152 
Examination practices should also be of a sufficiently high standard to ensure 
that only valid patents are issued, or appropriate administrative structures should 
be put in place to facilitate challenges to questionable patents. Examination 
practices are improving as patent offices are becoming more familiar with this 
new area of technology. Recently, Melanie Howlett and Andrew Christie 
undertook comparative studies relating to examination of EST patents in patent 
offices in the US, Europe, Japan and Australia. The authors sought examination 
of six hypothetical sequence claims by the four patent offices. They found that 
although the approach taken to examination differs slightly between offices, the 
results are essentially the same in all jurisdictions studied: EST patents will 
generally fail to fulfil the essential patenting requirements and hence will be 
rejected if no indication of specific function is provided or if the sequence 
claimed shows no unexpected effect, is obtained by conventional methods and 
has high homology with known DNA sequence.153 They concluded that fears 
 
149 However, it seems likely that this decision will be appealed, and it may be that the minority 
decision of Rader J is preferred. 
150 See above n 35. 
151 See Commission of the European Communities, European Commission Second Report, 
above n 88, 4. 
152 Ibid 5. 
153 Melanie J Howlett and Andrew F Christie, ‘An Analysis of the Approach of the European, 
Japanese and United States Patent Offices to Patenting Partial DNA Sequences (ESTs)’ (2003) 
34 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright 581, 601–2; Melanie J Howlett 
and Andrew F Christie, ‘An Analysis of the Approaches of the Trilateral and Australian Patent 
Offices to Patenting Partial DNA Sequences (ESTs)’ (2004) 15 Australian Intellectual Property 
Journal 156, 171–2. 
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held by the scientific community of a flood of granted EST patents for probes 
with no useful functions were not matched by patent examination practices. 
In contrast to the Howlett and Christie study, however, an analysis of the scope 
and claims of other gene patents granted in the US suggests that examiners may 
be allowing claims that do not fulfil the legal requirements.154 In this study, the 
authors excluded EST patents, focusing instead on complete sequences and other 
patents covering human genetic material, including mutations and diagnostic 
methods utilising the material. They examined 74 relevant patents on human 
genetic material, with a total of 1167 claims, and found that 38 per cent of claims 
were problematic, with utility and disclosure problems being found most 
frequently. They concluded that something needed to be done about the number 
of patents being granted ‘that arguably do not measure up to the federal patent 
law’.155 There has been some criticism of this study.156 Nevertheless, it does 
suggest that we should be cautious in concluding that all is well with examina-
tion practices. 
Does it matter that patent offices might issue some bad patents that do not 
fulfil the legal patenting requirements? Mark Lemley presents a persuasive case 
as to why it would be irrational to pay increased attention to validity and to put 
increased resources into the assessment of patent applications.157 He argues that 
a massive increase in resources would be required to ensure validity of issued 
patents and that challenging the validity of questionable patents in court is more 
efficient.158 However, Lemley’s views are not universally shared.159 There are 
legitimate fears that improper laws and bad patents will impact negatively on 
innovation. If access to the technology claimed in a key foundational patent is 
restricted, or if there are simply too many overlapping patent rights in a particu-
lar area, innovation can be blocked, delayed or deterred. However, a series of 
empirical studies on the impact of patents and patent licensing strategies in the 
biotechnology industry in various countries suggests that these fears do not 
appear to be eventuating at present.160 Rather, the industry is finding solutions to 
 
154 Jordan Paradise, Lori Andrews and Timothy Holbrook, ‘Patents on Human Genes: An Analysis 
of Scope and Claims’ (2005) 307 Science 1566, 1566–7. See also Merrill, Levin and Myers, 
above n 114, 47–9 for other examples. 
155 Paradise, Andrews and Holbrook, ‘Patents on Human Genes’, above n 154, 1566–7.  
156 Kate H Murashige, ‘Problems in Patenting Human Genes’ (2005) 308 Science 1868; Joseph J 
Rolla, ‘Problems in Patenting Human Genes’ (2005) 308 Science 1869. See also Jordan Para-
dise, Lori Andrews and Timothy Holbrook, ‘Response’ (2005) 308 Science 1869. 
157 Mark A Lemley, ‘Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office’ (2001) 95 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1495. 
158 Ibid 1531–2. 
159 See, eg, Arti K Rai, ‘Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1035, 1080–4. 
160 John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen, ‘Effects of Research Tool Patenting and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation’ in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds), Patents 
in the Knowledge-Based Economy (2003) 285, 331. See also John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and 
Wesley M Cohen, ‘Working Through the Patent Problem’ (2003) 299 Science 1021; Joseph 
Straus, Henrik Holzapfel and Matthias Lindenmeir, Empirical Survey on ‘Genetic Inventions 
and Patent Law’ (2002); Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, ‘Patents and Medical Biotechnology: 
An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry’ (Occasional Paper No 6, Centre 
for Law and Genetics, 2003) 57 <http://www.ipria.org/publications/pubfliers/BiotechReport 
Final.pdf>; Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, ‘Australian Medical Biotechnology: Navigating a 
Complex Patent Landscape’ [2005] European Intellectual Property Review 313, 316; Intellectual 
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avoid these theoretical problems. The studies consistently report that one of the 
features of the industry is vigorous licensing activity. In particular, patents 
claiming foundational research tools, including gene patents, tend to be non-ex-
clusively licensed. Other strategies include inventing around patented inventions, 
ignoring patents of questionable validity and challenging the validity of these 
patents in the courts. 
There are also legal mechanisms for dealing with restrictions on access to 
patented technology post-grant. Most jurisdictions have provisions in their patent 
legislation that allow for use without the authorisation of the patent holder in 
certain limited circumstances.161 For example, the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 133 
and 135 provide that compulsory licences can be issued when ‘the reasonable 
requirements of the public’ have not been met. There is also protection from 
infringement for use by the Crown in s 163, where there is use of the patented 
invention ‘for the services of the Commonwealth or State’ when ‘necessary for 
the proper provision of those services’.162 Most jurisdictions also recognise that 
certain types of research should be exempt from infringement. However, it 
should be noted that in practically all jurisdictions the ambit of such an exemp-
tion is presently unclear and the subject of debate.163 
The industry itself is also exploring a number of initiatives aimed at encourag-
ing innovation, and the theoretical literature in this area is expanding. One aspect 
of this is a push to keep basic scientific results in the public domain. For 
example, participants in the Human Genome Project agreed to keep primary 
sequences in the public domain and to rapidly release them.164 Other initiatives 
 
Property Institute on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry, UK, Patents for Genetic 
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include patent pooling and cross-licensing,165 clearing house mechanisms166 and 
even the incorporation of open source principles from copyright law.167 
In combination, provided that the best available mechanisms are used for 
granting gene patents and that these are combined with the best available 
post-grant practices, the biotechnology industry will survive and should flourish. 
There will, no doubt, be future skirmishes in the gene patent wars, future 
attempts to claim too much reward for too little input, and these actions could 
have a negative impact on innovation within the industry as a whole. However, 
there are many weapons in the innovator’s armory, both legal and non-legal, both 
pre- and post-grant. Ultimately, the blunt tool of competition law is always 
available to be unleashed against the most egregious abuses of patent rights. In 
an ideal world the law relating to gene patents would be proper and certain, and 
only good patents would be issued. Having said this, when considering the need 
for reform of the law relating to gene patents, as with any other area of law 
reform, idealism has to be matched with pragmatism. 
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